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Mahemud Eshtu Tekuya*

GOVERNING THE NILE UNDER CLIMATIC
UNCERTAINTY: THE NEED FOR A CLIMATEPROOF BASIN-WIDE TREATY
I.

INTRODUCTION

Climate change is projected to have catastrophic impacts on the
hydrological cycle.1 Water availability, quantity, and demand will be affected by
climate change.2 Existing studies show that climate change is changing “the timing
of water (when water is delivered), quantity (how much water is available) and
quality of the water resources.”3 Even worse, these changes are coming at a time
when the sustainability of water resources is severely strained by other non-climatic
factors, such as population growth, economic development, and urbanization. All of
these factors will decrease water supply or increase demand.4 Responding to such
changes requires building flexibility and adaptability into watercourse treaties.5
However, the flexibility needed within these treaties to address the ramifications of
climate change could impact the predictability and certainty required by water
sharing States that rely on the language of a watercourse treaty.6 Thus, developing
principles, procedures, and institutions capable of accommodating the ramifications
of climate change is challenging as it requires governing uncertainty, which is at
odds with the notion of legal certainty.7

*
LL.B, LL, M, JSD/ PhD. Candidate in McGeorge School of Law. This Article is dedicated, in loving
memory, to Kidane Ayalew. I am very grateful to my supervisor, Professor Stephen McCaffrey for his
precious comments on the earlier version of this work. I am also grateful to Serena Wheaton and the
editorial team of the University of New Mexico Natural Resources Journal for their insights and editorial
support.
1. See generally NIGEL ARNELL ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
THIRD ASSESSMENT REPORT: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VENERABILITY, CH. 4, HYDROLOGY AND
WATER RESOURCES (2001), http://web.archive.org/web/20180613000247/http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports
/tar/wg2/pdf/wg2TARchap4.pdf.
2. See Linda L. Nash & Peter H. Glick, Sensitivity of Streamflow and Water Supply in Colorado
Basin to Climate Change, in THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN AND GREENHOUSE EFFECT 25 (1990).
3. Tuula Honkonen, Water Security and Climate Change: The Need for Adaptive Governance, 20
PIONEER PEER-REVIEWED 1, 2 (2017).
4. See NIGELL W. ARNELL ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, FIFTH
ASSESSMENT REPORT, CH. 3, FRESHWATER RESOURCES 234 (2014).
5. See generally Stephen McCaffrey, The Need for Flexibility in Freshwater Treaty Regimes, 27
NAT. RESOURCES F. 156 (2003).
6. ALISTAIR RIEU-CLARKE ET AL., TRANSBOUNDARY WATER GOVERNANCE AND CLIMATE
CHANGE ADAPTATION: INTERNATIONAL LAW, POLICY GUIDELINES AND BEST PRACTICE APPLICATION
34 (2015).
7. Honkonen, supra note 3, at 3; see also A. Dan Tarlock, Four Challenges for International Water
Law, 23 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 369, 383-84 (2009).
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But still, as the law of treaties does not “ordinarily permit unilateral
modification or withdrawal when such changes occur,”8 parties are “required to work
within the framework of existing treaties to respond to changes” associated with
climate change.9 Nevertheless, most of the existing watercourse treaties, locked in
rigid rules and procedures, are unable to provide the flexibility needed to address the
anticipated changes due to climate change.10 Only a few watercourse treaties possess
the intrinsic capacity for dealing with the ramifications of climate change.11
This article examines treaty flexibility and climate change adaptation in the
context of the Nile Basin. The Nile Basin is the focus of a voluminous body of
academic literature, but there are gaps in the literature regarding the legal regimes of
the Nile. Political scientists have extensively studied the role of power dynamics and
hydro-hegemony in their effort to determine “who gets how much [of the Nile] water,
when, where and why?”12 Peace and Security scholars have also addressed the issue
of whether the Nile River will be a source of conflict or a catalyst for cooperation.13
Legal scholars, on the other hand, have explored some of the substantive issues
concerning the fragmented legal regimes governing the Nile watercourse.14 Still

8. McCaffrey, supra note 5, at 159.
9. Id.
10. Joseph W. Dellapenna, Adapting the Law of Water Management to Global Climate Change and
Other Hydro-political Stresses, 35 J. AM. WATER ASS’N 1301, 1302 (1999); McCaffrey, supra note 5, at
156; Gretta Goldenman, Adapting to Climate Change: A Study of International Rivers and Their Legal
Arrangements, 17 ECOLOGY L. Q. 741 (1990); A. Dan Tarlock, How Well Can International Water
Allocation Regimes Adapt to Global Climate Change, 15 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 423, 433-34 (2000);
Elizabeth J. Kistin & Peter J. Ashton, Adapting to Change on Transboundary Rivers: An Analysis of
Treaty Flexibility on the Orange-Senqu River Basin, 24 INT’L J. WATER RES. DEV. 1 (2008); see also Itay
Fischhendler, Legal and Institutional Adaptation to Climate Uncertainty: A Study of International Rivers,
6 WATER POL’Y 1, 3 (2004).
11. Glen Hearns & Richard Kyle Paisley, Lawyers Write Treaties, Engineers Build Dikes, Gods of
Weather Ignore Both: Making Transboundary Waters Agreements Relevant, Flexible, and Resilient in a
Time of Global Climate Change, 6 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 259, 262 (2013).
12. See Melvin Woodhouse & Mark Zeitoun, Hydro-Hegemony and International Water Law:
Grappling with the Gaps of Power and Law, 10 WATER POL’Y 103, 113 (2008); Ana Elisa Cascao & Mark
Zeitoun, Power, Hegemony and Critical Hydropolitics, reprinted in TRANSBOUNDARY WATER
MANAGEMENT: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE, 39 (Anton Earle et. al. eds., 2010); Rawia Tawfik, Revisiting
Hydro-hegemony from a Benefit-Sharing Perspective: The Case of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance
Dam, 5 GERMAN DEV. INST. 1 (2015); John Waterbury, Is the Status Quo in the Nile Basin Viable?, 4
BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 287, 287 (1997); Ana Elisa Cascao, Changing Power Relations in the Nile River
Basin: Unilateralism vs. Cooperation?, 2 WATER ALTERNATIVES 245, 245 (2009); YACOB ARSANO,
ETHIOPIA AND THE NILE DILEMMAS OF NATIONAL AND REGIONAL HYDROPOLITICS (2007); Daniel
Kendie, Egypt and the Hydro-Politics of the Blue Nile River, 6 NORTHEAST AFR. STUD. 141, 145-46
(1999).
13. Kristin Wiebe, The Nile River: Potential for Conflict and Cooperation in the Face of Water
Degradation, 41 NAT. RESOURCES. J. 731 (2001); see NURIT KLIOT, WATER RESOURCES AND CONFLICT
IN THE MIDDLE EAST (1994); Yehenew Tsegaye Walilegne, The Nile Basin: From Confrontation to
Cooperation, 27 DALHOUSIE L.J. 503, 505 (2004); SIMON A. MASON, FROM CONFLICT TO COOPERATION
IN THE NILE BASIN (2003).
14. See GEBRE TSADIK DEGEFU, THE NILE: HISTORICAL, LEGAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL
PERSPECTIVES (2003); Fasil Amdetsion, Scrutinizing the Scorpion Problematique: Arguments in Favor
of the Continued Relevance of International Law and a Multidisciplinary Approach to Resolving the Nile
Dispute, 44 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 16 (2008); Dereje Zeleke Mekonnen, Between the Scylla of Water Security
and Charybdis of Benefit Sharing: The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement - Failed or Just
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absent, however, is both a detailed analysis of treaty flexibility in the Nile Basin and
a proposal for building a basin-wide, climate-proof treaty.
This article intends to fill both of these gaps. Part II presents the
geographical and climatic setting of the Nile Basin. It then sets the background by
briefly summarizing the key results from recent climate change modeling studies.
Part III introduces the mechanisms that can provide flexibility in watercourse
treaties; it reviews the practice of various water sharing countries and encapsulates
the principal ways of building a climate-proof treaty. Part IV analyzes the legal
regime governing the Nile watercourse in light of this background. This part
specifically probes the 1959 Nile Treaty between Egypt and Sudan, the 2010
Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) and the 2015 Agreement on Declarations
of Principles (DoPs) on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in terms of
flexible allocation strategies, response to extreme events, amendment or review
processes, termination clauses, and institutional responsibilities such as data
gathering and decision- making. Part IV then submits that none of the existing
treaties, including the CFA, provide sufficient mechanisms for addressing the
possible consequences of climate change. Part V proposes a flexible basin-wide
treaty capable of accommodating the ramifications of climate change. Part VI
provides concluding remarks, which call upon Nile Basin States to set aside their
egoistic national interests and address the ramifications of climate change by
developing a basin-wide, climate-proof treaty.
II.

THE NILE, GEOGRAPHY, HYDROLOGY AND THE INFLUENCE
OF CLIMATE CHANGE

The Nile, considered the longest river in the world, extends 6,695
kilometers from the Ruvyironza River in Burundi, its most distant source, to the
Mediterranean Sea.15 But this is only the White Nile, which is joined by the other
main tributary of the river, the Blue Nile, in Khartoum, Sudan.16 The Blue Nile
originates in Lake Tana, Ethiopia,17 and “makes [a] 1,000- kilometer loop through
Ethiopian territory, carving a 600-meter-deep gorge through the highlands.”18 It

Teetering on the Brink?, 3 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 345 (2011); Salman M.A. Salman, The Nile Basin
Cooperative Framework Agreement: A Peacefully Unfolding African Spring?, 38 WATER INT’L 17
(2012); Tadesse Kassa Woldetsadik, International Watercourses Law in the Nile River Basin: Three
States at a Crossroads, BRITISH Y.B. INT’L L. 193 (2013); MWANGI KIMENYI & JOHN MBAKU,
GOVERNING THE NILE RIVER BASIN: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW LEGAL REGIME (2015); Salman M.A.
Salman, The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: The Road to the Declaration of Principles and the
Khartoum Document, 42 WATER INT’L 512, 515-16 (2016).
15. See Nile Basin Initiative, The Water Resources of the Nile Basin, in STATE OF THE RIVER NILE
BASIN 27-28 (2012),http://nileis.nilebasin.org/system/files/Nile%20SoB%20Report%20Chpater%202%
20-%20Water%20resources.pdf.
16. See STEPHEN MCCAFFREY ET AL., PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES, PROBLEMS AND TEXTS
1046 (2010).
17. See STEPHEN MCCAFFREY, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES 258 (2nd ed. 2007);
see also Nile Basin Initiative, supra note 15, at 28; see also HAGGAI ERLICH, THE CROSS AND THE RIVER:
ETHIOPIA, EGYPT, AND THE NILE 1 (2002).
18. Id.
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carries more water than the White Nile, but its flow varies tremendously with the
seasons, whereas that of the White Nile is stable throughout the year.19
The Nile Basin covers 3.18 million square kilometers, which accounts for
10 percent of Africa.20 While this makes the Basin the third largest in the world, the
quantity of the freshwater carried by the river (84 billion cubic meters (BCM)) is
actually very small compared with other rivers. The Nile’s annual discharges
constitute “a mere cup (2 per cent) of the Amazon, perhaps a glass (15 per cent) of
the Mississippi, or at best a pitcher (20 per cent) of the Mekong.”21 This relatively
small amount of water is to be shared by eleven Nile Basin States22 in one of the
“most water-deficient parts of the world.”23 Moreover, “the fact that the region’s
population is growing at 3% a year and is projected to reach 859 million in 2025 (up
from 245 million in 1990) is likely to exacerbate the water scarcity in the Nile Basin
area.”24
The Nile Basin is very diverse in terms of both climate and topographical
futures. “[E]xtending over 35º of latitude, from the equatorial zone to the northern
subtropics, and over elevations that range from more than 4000 m to sea level . . . “25
the Nile River travels through five distinct climate regions.
Downstream, Egypt and parts of Sudan have a dry, desert like
climate with precipitation of less than 200 millimeters (mm) per
year. Sudan and small parts of Ethiopia have a steppe climate with
rainfall ranging between 200 and 400 mm a year. The precipitation
from these two climatic regions does not contribute any water to
the Nile. Upstream, the Nile Basin contains the tropical rainforest
climate, the tropical savannah climate, and the highland (tropical)
climate. These climates serve as the source of the Nile, receiving
1,400 to 1,800 mm of rainfall per year.26
As the river flows from its sources, both in the Lake Victoria and Lake Tana
Basins, to its mouth where it empties into the Mediterranean Sea, it passes through
geographical areas where there is a decrease in the amount of precipitation and an

19. See Nile Basin Initiative, supra note 15, at 36. “The Blue Nile (Abay) (60 %), Atbara (Tekezze),
and Sobat (Baro), contribute between 85 and 90 percent of the annual Nile flows, but the Blue Nile (Abay)
can be seen to respond directly to the seasonal rain patterns, exhibiting clear dry and wet spells.” White
Nile, on the other hand, “contributes between 10 and 15 percent to the annual Nile discharge, but is fairly
stable throughout the year.” Id.
20. Id. at 27.
21. See ROBERT O. COLLINS, THE NILE 11 (2002).
22. See Nile Basin Initiative, supra note 15, at 27. Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, South Sudan, Sudan and Egypt are the Nile Basin States
that share the Nile watercourse.
23. See Amdetsion, supra note 14, at 3.
24. Id.
25. See Jessica Barnes, The Future of the Nile: Climate Change, Land Use, Infrastructure
Management, and Treaty Negotiations in a Transboundary River Basin, 8 WIRES CLIM. CHANGE 2
(2017).
26. See Alice Shih & Trevor Stutz, Sink or Swim: Abrogating the Nile Treaties While Upholding the
Rule of Law, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. 10786, 10788 (2013).
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increase in potential evapotranspiration.27 The mean annual rainfall ranges from
1700 mm in the Ethiopian highlands to less than 25 mm in Ciro, Egypt.28 The rainfall
parameters of the Basin exhibit a high level of both inter-annual and inter-decadal
variability.29 This means that the Nile River experiences both intra– and inter–
seasonal fluctuations in climatic parameters.30
For a long time, the Nile Basin States have been affected by such climate
variability,31 and recent climate change is exacerbating the vulnerability of the Basin
States.32 Climate change and its ramifications on the Nile watercourse are threatening
the lives and livelihoods of the people living in the basin.33 According to scientific
studies, climate change-induced problems that lie ahead for the Nile Basin States
include: increase and/or decrease in river flow; increase in frequency of floods and
droughts; sea level rise; increase in temperature and evaporation; changes in patterns
of rainfall, runoff, and sediment yield as well as in ecosystems, vegetation cover, and
crop yields; and increase in reservoir and swamp evaporation rates.34
Most relevant to this article are the ramifications of climate change on the
Nile water resource, and more precisely, the concerns of future rainfall, river flow,
and water availability. Most studies and climate change models are commonly
predicating increases in average annual temperature, leading to greater loss of water
due to evaporation and adding some level of certainty to the accuracy of these
projections.35 There is much less certainty in projections concerning future rainfall,
river flow, and water availability. Studies concerning the latter issues, find
contradictory results; one result predicts floods and increased runoff,36 and the other
27. See MERON TEFERI TAYE ET AL., THE LIVED EXPERIENCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE: WATER CASE
STUDY ON THE NILE AND RHINE RIVER BASINS 12, 14 (2012).
28. Teferi Mekonnen, The Blue Nile Issue: A History of Hydropolitics, 1884-1974, 10 (2004)
(unpublished M.A. thesis, Addis Ababa University); see also U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., CLIMATE
CHANGE INFORMATION FACT SHEET EGYPT 2 (2015) (estimating the annual average rainfall from 1961
to 1990 as 41.8 mm).
29. TEFERI TAYE ET AL., supra note 27, at 12, 14; see also ANTON EARLE ET AL, TRANSBOUNDARY
WATER MANAGEMENT AND THE CLIMATE CHANGE DEBATE 117 (2015) (Climate variability as an old
issue in the Nile Basin).
30. See EARLE ET AL., supra note 29, at 129.
31. NILE BASIN INITIATIVE, STATE OF THE RIVER NILE BASIN, CHANGE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
THE NILE REGION 210 (2012), http://nileis.nilebasin.org/system/files/Nile%20SoB%20Report%20
Chapter%208%20%20Climate%20Change.pdf.
32. Id.
33. See U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION CAPACITIES IN THE NILE RIVER
BASIN 13 (2015), http://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/14068/Nile%20Climate%20
change%20fa.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
34. See EARLE ET AL., supra note 29, at 130.
35. Id.; Declan Conway, From Headwater Tributaries to International River: Observing and
Adapting to Climate Variability and Change in the Nile Basin, 15 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 99, 106
(2005); see U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, supra note 33, at 13; HEATHER COOLEY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING
AND REDUCING THE RISKS OF CLIMATE CHANGE FOR TRANSBOUNDARY WATERS 19 (2009); See
generally, Ungtae Kim & Jagath J. Kaluarachchi, Climate Change Impacts on Water Resources in the
Upper Blue Nile River Basin, Ethiopia, 45 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES ASS’N 1361 (2009); Barnes, supra
note 25, at 2-6.
36. Nigel W. Arnell, Climate Change and Global Water Resources: SRES Emissions and Socioeconomic Scenarios, 14 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 31, 31-49 (2004); Reinhard Voss et al., Enhanced
Resolution Modelling Study on Anthropogenic Climate Change: Changes in Extremes of The
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result predicts water scarcity and possible droughts.37 It seems evident that proper
governance of the Nile in the face of these uncertainties demands response to two
contradictory scenarios, either increase in water availability and flooding or water
scarcity and drought; each of which requires opposite adaptation strategies.38
Building flexible and resilient legal and institutional arrangements will no
doubt be at the heart of such adaptation strategies.39 If climate change reduces the
available water in the Nile Basin, competition for water between riparian States
would only intensify, possibly leading to conflicts over water. If the available water
resources increase due to climate change, this will create a need for new legal
responses to flooding. In either case, flexibility in watercourse treaties will be crucial
“as water management systems struggle to adapt to the altered precipitation and flow
patterns.”40 The next part introduces the principal ways of building flexibility into
watercourse treaties.
III.

ADAPTING TO CLIMATE CHANGE: BUILDING FLEXIBILITY
IN TREATY REGIMES

It is clear that a new paradigm of flexibility in water treaties is essential to
adapt to climate change. In this part, this article relies on the works of the leading
scholars in the field such as Professor and water laurate Stephen McCaffrey and
Professor Itay Fischhendler, and encapsulates five mechanisms through which
flexibility can be provided for in watercourse treaties.41 The five principal ways to
build a climate-proof treaty are to incorporate: (1) flexible allocation strategies; (2)
extreme events provisions; (3) amendment and review procedures; (4) termination
clauses; and (5) River Basin Organizations (RBOs).42 This article will examine each
mechanism below, beginning with flexible water allocation.
Hydrological Cycle 22 INT’L J. CLIMATOLOGY, 755 771-73 (2002); see also WALTINA SCHUEMANN &
MANUEL SCHIFFLER, WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST: POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICTS AND PROSPECTS FOR
COOPERATION 146 (1998) (cited in Shih & Stutz, supra note 26, at 10789 (“Some experts estimate that
the Nile’s flow will increase by as much as 30%, while others estimate a decrease of up to 78%”)).
37. Shih & Stutz, supra note 26, at 10789; see Conway, supra note 35, at 106; Vivek K. Arora &
George J. Boer, Effects of Simulated Climate Change on the Hydrology of Major River Basins, 106(D4),
J. GEOPHYSICAL RES. 3335, 3335-48 (2001); see also EARLE ET AL., supra note 29, at 118 (discussing
scientific findings and the politicization of climate change).
38. Richard Kyle Paisley, Why the 11 Countries that Rely on the Nile Need to Reach a River
Deal Soon, CONVERSATION (Aug. 27, 2017), https://theconversation.com/why-the-11-countries-thatrely-on-the-nile-need-to-reach-a-river-deal-soon-75868. It is worth mentioning that the global climate
change discourse has two approaches, mitigation and adaptation, for tackling the problems of climate
change. While mitigation focuses on resolving the root causes of climate change by controlling
greenhouse gases (GHGs) emissions and mitigating the rise of global temperature, adaptation “accepts
the projected increases and seeks to understand both the effects of global climate change and the impacts
of those effects in order to adapt to them.” See Tarlock, supra note 10, at 423-24.
39. See also Gabriel Eckstein, Water Scarcity, Conflict, and Security in a Climate Change World:
Challenges and Opportunities for International Law and Policy, 27 WIS. INT’L L.J. 410, 432-33 (2009);
see McCaffrey, supra note 5, at 159; Hearns & Paisley, supra note 11, at 259-60; Fischhendler, supra
note 10, at 3; Goldenman, supra note 10, at 741; Cooley et al., supra note 35, at 14; RIEU-CLARKE, supra
note 6, at 9-11.
40. See Dellapenna, supra note 10, at 1302.
41. See Fischhendler, supra note 10, at 158; see McCaffrey, supra note 5, at 1.
42. See Fischhendler, supra note 10, at 159-60; see McCaffrey, supra note 5, at 3.
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Flexible Water Allocation

Water sharing States may use flexible water allocation strategies in
watercourse treaties to achieve sustainable water supply in the face of climate
change. Instead of allocating shared waters based on the assumption of a fixed, and
often too optimistic, perpetual water supply, or fixed allocation strategy, parties
should allocate their shared water resources in accordance with the social, economic,
or climatic changing conditions existing in the Basin States.43 There are a couple of
ways this can be achieved. A rather simple method is to enter into an agreement
which requires upstream States to deliver a minimum flow to a downstream riparian
State in order “to maintain human health and basic ecological functions.”44 The other
mechanism is to proportionally “allocate the water based on a percentage of the flow
and time of flow, rather than a fixed or minimum amount.”45 Although this approach
“requires flexible infrastructure, effective operating rules, and regular
communication and data sharing,”46 it “allows flow regimes to respond to both wet
and dry conditions.”47
2.

Response Strategy for Extreme Events

Perhaps the most common mechanism for enhancing treaty flexibility is to
include special provisions in watercourse treaties that govern particular kinds of
exceptional circumstances, such as droughts and floods.48 For instance, the 1944
agreement between the United States and Mexico on the Rio Grande and Colorado
Rivers has provisions governing possible problems resulting from drought.49 The
agreement allows Mexico to deliver less than the minimum quantity of water to the
United States during an “extraordinary drought” for up to five years.50 If deficiencies
occur during this period, Mexico is to repay by increasing flows during the next fiveyear cycle.51 In case of the Colorado River, the agreement guarantees that Mexico
receives a certain annual quantity of the Colorado River’s water from the United
States.52 “In the event of extraordinary drought” though, the water allotted to Mexico
is to “be reduced in the same proportion as consumptive uses in the United States are
reduced.”53

43.
44.
45.
46.

See Fischhendler, supra note 10, at 21.
See RIEU-CLARKE, supra note 6, at 34.
Id.
Heather Cooley & Peter H. Gleick, Climate-Proofing Transboundary Water Agreements, 56
HYDROLOGICAL SCI. J. 711, 715 (2011).
47. Id.
48. Id.; see also Fischhendler, supra note 10, at 5; McCaffrey, supra note 5, at 160; Goldenman,
supra note 10; Eckstein, supra note 39, at 457; Cooley et al., supra note 35, at 15.
49. See Treaty between the United States of America and Mexico Respecting Utilization of the
Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, Mex.-U.S., Feb. 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219,
T.S. No. 994 art. 4 (1946) (entered into force Nov. 8, 1945) [hereinafter 1944 Colorado Treaty].
50. Id. at art. 4, ¶ b(c).
51. Id. at art. 4, ¶ b(d).
52. Id. at art. 10, ¶ a.
53. Id. at art. 10, ¶ b.
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Floods, although posing serious risks for lower riparian States, are often
ignored in the recent discourse of climate change concerning resilience and
adaptability of international watercourse treaties.54 Most international watercourses
are not governed by regimes with the institutional capacity to address the problem of
flooding.55 Only a few watercourse treaties include flood management systems.
Among such treaties, the Columbia River Basin Treaty stipulates that “Canada (the
upstream party) will adjust its operation of hydroelectric dams to mitigate flooding
in the United States.”56 In addition, the Agreement on the Cooperation for
Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin provides maximum river flow
rates, requiring “upstream dam operations to be adjusted to meet these
requirements.”57
3.

Amendment and Periodic Review

Amendment and periodic review processes give the riparian States the
chance to address unforeseen circumstances, while “resynchroniz[ing] national and
basin-wide strategies with new knowledge and changing circumstance.”58 These
processes are crucial for the sustainability of watercourse treaties because, through
time, the hydrological and climatic conditions on which such treaties are based will
change significantly.59 This is particularly true in the era of climate change.
Several mechanisms can be used to amend watercourse treaties. In the
Colorado River Basin, for instance, modifications of the 1944 Colorado Treaty are
made through the “minutes” of meetings of the International Boundary and Water
Commission (IBWC), a joint commission charged with the application of the Treaty
and composed of an Engineer Commissioner from both parties (U.S. and Mexico,).60
The Mekong River Basin Agreement between Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and
Vietnam also allows the alteration of the Agreement through amendment proposals
agreed to by all the parties.61
In addition, some international watercourse treaties have provisions dealing
with periodic reviews. In the Syr Darya River Basin, for instance, the Framework
Agreement requires periodic review of Agreements “on water releases, production
and transit of electricity, and compensations for energy losses” and calls for the
54. See Cooley et al., supra note 35, at 15.
55. Id.
56. Id.; Treaty Relating to Cooperative Development of the Water Resources of the Columbia River
Basin, U.S.-Can., opened for signature Jan. 17, 1961, 542 U.N.T.S. 244, [hereinafter Columbia River
Treaty-CRT]. It is worth nothing that flood protection is the main purpose of the CRT.
57. Id.
58. See Kistin & Ashton, supra note 10, at 6. Indeed, review process has been addressed in the
Kishenganga case between Pakistan and India. The award states that after seven years from the
implementation of the project either party may seek reconsideration of the tribunal’s minimum flow
requirement. See In re Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration (Pak. v. India), Case No. 2011-01, Final
Order, at ¶ 119 (Permanent Court of Arbitration 2013), https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/48. This
was because “a degree of uncertainty is inherent in any attempt to predict environmental responses to
changing conditions.” See id. ¶ 117.
59. Cooley et al., supra note 35, at 16.
60. 1944 Colorado Treaty, supra note 49, at art. 2, 25; see McCaffrey, supra note 5, at 161.
61. Agreement on Co-operation for Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin art. 37,
Apr. 5, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 864 (1995).
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conclusion of new Agreements annually.62 Another example is the Treaty between
India and Nepal governing Mahakali River, which requires a review every ten years
or “earlier as required by either party.”63
4.

Termination Clauses

The fourth mechanism for enhancing treaty flexibility is to simply include
a termination clause in the treaty allowing any riparian State “to terminate it upon a
given period of notice, e.g. six months.”64 In the Syr Darya Basin, for instance, the
Framework Agreement restricts its validity to five years,65 allowing automatic
renewal for another five years provided that no termination notice is submitted “six
months in advance from any party.”66 In so doing, the Framework Agreement
provides sufficient flexibility for parties adversely affected by changed
circumstances, permitting them to withdraw from what could otherwise be an
oppressive treaty.67
It is, however, to be noted that a termination clause would not always be
appropriate for all types of treaties. As pointed out by McCaffrey, it would best fit
only treaties that do “not involve permanent structures but provide for allocations of
water . . . “68
5.

River Basin Organizations (RBOs)

Sustainable transboundary water management is inextricably linked with
RBOs. Developing an institutional structure for joint management of transboundary
watercourses is essential for the pragmatic application of both substantive and
procedural principles governing transboundary watercourses.69 Indeed, RBOs play a
significant role in building flexibility into watercourse treaties. RBOs’ ability to
adapt, amend, and extend the institutional arrangement between riparian States is at
the center of developing greater resilience and adaptability to the changing
environment. Of the 260 transboundary river basins, about 119 of them have water
institutions.70 While the roles and authorities of such institutions vary significantly,
institutions capable of adapting to the challenges of climate change should “have a

62. See McCaffrey, supra note 5, at 159.
63. Treaty Between His Majesty’s Government of Nepal and the Government of India Concerning
the Integrated Development of the Mahakali River Including the Sarada Barrage, Tanakpur Barrage and
Pancheshwar Project, India-Nepal, art. 12, Feb. 12, 1996.
64. Agreement Between the Governments of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and
the Republic of Uzbekistan on the Use of Water and Energy Resources of the Syr Darya Basin art. 12,
Mar. 17, 1998. [hereinafter Syr Darya Basin Treaty]; see also McCaffrey, supra note 5, at 160.
65. Syr Darya Basin Treaty, supra note 64, at art. 12; see also McCaffrey, supra note 5, at 159-60.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 160.
69. See Hearns & Paisley, supra note 11, 274-75.
70. See Cooley & Gleick, supra note 46, at 2 (mentioning 260 international river basins), 6
(mentioning 106 RBO). See also Susanne Schmeier, Opening the Black Box of River Basin Organizations,
GLOBAL WATER F. (Oct. 16, 2012) (mentioning 119 RBO), http://www.globalwaterforum.org
/2012/10/16/opening-the-black-box- of-river-basin-organizations/.
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broad scope, include all riparian nations, and have management and enforcement
authority.”71 Factors that are likely to influence the resilience of the RBOs include:
[t]he membership structure of the organization, focusing on
whether all riparians in the respective basin are included in joint
climate change adaptation activities; the functional scope of the
RBO, focusing on the degree of integration of water resources
management and climate change adaptation; a decision-making
mechanism that ensures the timely and efficient adoption of
decisions; the existence and the well-functioning of data and
information sharing mechanisms ensuring long-term cooperation;
the existence and well-functioning of dispute-resolution/conflict
management mechanisms allowing for solving emerging waterrelated collective action problems; [and] the secured availability
of financial resources for climate change adaptation activities in
the basin [..].72
Consequentially, although mechanisms discussed in this section are by no
means exhaustive, water sharing States are recommended to use these mechanisms
when building climate-proofing treaties to adapt to climate change. The next part of
this article specifically analyzes the legal regime governing the Nile Basin using the
aforementioned five mechanisms.
IV.
1.

THE LEGAL RÉGIME GOVERNING THE NILE BASIN:
ANALYSIS OF TREATY FLEXIBILITY

Overview of the Nile Water Agreements: A Fragmented Legal Regime

Legal and institutional frameworks are essential for efficient transboundary
water management. Riparian States are often advised by scholars to regulate the use
and allocation of their shared water resources through a basin-wide treaty.73 This
advice seems to be ignored in the Nile Basin, however. The Nile Basin has no
mutually acceptable legal framework applicable to all riparian States.74 Currently,
three types of legal instruments – bilateral treaties, a multilateral agreement
establishing a framework for cooperation, and a tripartite agreement on a declaration
of principles – are governing the use and allocation of Nile waters.
Several bilateral treaties have been agreed to between riparian States and
their colonial masters concerning the flow of the Nile waters since the end of the 19th
century.75 Of these bilateral treaties, the 1902, 1929, and 1959 Agreements are the
most controversial and widely disputed treaties.76 First, the 1902 Agreement was a
bilateral treaty concluded between Great Britain, on behalf of Sudan, and Ethiopia
71. See Cooley et al., supra note 35, at 16.
72. See Sabine Schulze & Susanne Schmeier, Governing Environmental Change in International
River Basins the Role of River Basin Organizations, INT’L J. BASIN MGMT. 229 (2012).
73. See McCaffrey, supra note 5, at 157.
74. See MCCAFFREY, supra note 17, at 262.
75. Amdetsion, supra note 14, at 19; Salman, supra note 14, at 18; Mekonnen, supra note 14, 35155.
76. Salman, supra note 14, at 18-19.
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to determine the boundary between Ethiopia and Sudan.77 Although the agreement
is about boundary delineation, it contains a provision relating to the waters of the
Nile, in which Ethiopia undertook “not to construct or allow to be constructed, any
work across the Blue Nile, Lake Tana, or the Sobat, which would arrest the flow of
their waters into the Nile except in agreement with His Britannic Majesty’s
Government of the Sudan.”78
Second, the 1929 Nile Agreement was a bilateral treaty between Egypt and
Britain, representing Sudan and its East African colonies.79 This agreement,
recognizing the historical and natural rights of Egypt, gave Egypt veto power over
any construction projects along the Nile River and its tributaries.80 It also allocated
a volumetric quantity of water to each State, 48 BCM for Egypt and 4 BCM for
Sudan. In so doing, it determined the amount of waters each State received, which
the 1959 Agreement then used as the “established rights” of the two States.81
Third, the 1959 Agreement was a bilateral treaty between Egypt and
Sudan.82 This agreement was meant to allocate the net benefit generated from the
High Aswan Dam (HAD). Although more favorable to Sudan than the 1929
Agreement, the 1959 Agreement also allocated the bulk of the Nile’s waters, 55.5
BCM, to Egypt (66% of the 84 BCM total water flow), 18.5 BCM, (22%) to Sudan
and left the remaining 10 BCM (12%) for evaporation.83 It does not recognize the
rights of the upstream States.
The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) is the other
important legal instrument concerning the uses and allocations the Nile watercourse.
The CFA was the result of the riparian States attempt to prepare a basin-wide legal
and institutional framework that would regulate the interstate utilization and
management of the Nile River. The process of the CFA was started in the early 1990s
and formalized in the adaption of the Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Project
(Project D3) in 1995.84 All Nile riparian States at the time, except Eritrea,
participated in the project, and with financial and technical support from United
77. See Treaty on the Delimitation of the Frontier between Ethiopia and Sudan, Eth.-Gr. Brit. May
15, 1902, http://treaties.fco.gov.uk/docs/pdf/1902/TS0016.pdf [hereinafter 1902 Treaty].
78. See id. at art. 3 (emphasis added). Egypt considers itself as successor of this treaty and claims
that Ethiopia should get Egypt’s consent to build any project. Ethiopia rejected this treaty, claiming that
it was not ratified, and that the meaning of the word “arrest” in the Amharic (Ethiopian Language) version
of the treaty does not preclude Ethiopia from using the waters. See Salman, supra note 14, at 18.
79. See Exchange of Notes between Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and the
Egyptian Government on the Use of Waters of the Nile for Irrigation (May 1929), [hereinafter the 1929
Agreement].
80. See id. at art. 4(ii) (“Except with the prior consent of the Egyptian Government, no irrigation
works shall be undertaken, nor electric generators installed along the Nile and its branches [ . . . ]”) In
1962, former British East Africa colonies, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, using Nyerere doctrine, declared
that they were no longer bound this treaty. Yet, Egypt still claims that this treaty is valid and binding on
those parties.
81. See Agreement Between the Republic of Sudan and the United Arab Republic Egypt on the Full
Utilization of the Waters of the Nile, art. 1(1), Nov. 8, 1959, 453 U.N.T.S. 51 [hereinafter 1959
Agreement] (characterizing the aforementioned quantities as ‘established right of the parties).
82. See generally id.
83. Id. at 64.
84. Interview with Professor McCaffrey, Legal Consultant, Nile Cooperative Framework Project, in
Sacramento, Ca. (Nov. 2017) [hereinafter Interview with Professor McCaffrey].
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Nations Development Program (UNDP), the project provided for high level legal
and political negotiations toward the conclusion of a basin-wide agreement. A
separate but parallel track, the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), focused on development,
was supported by the World Bank beginning in 1999 and was participated in by the
same nine Nile Basin States that participated in the CFA.85
During the negotiations, the fate of the 1902, 1929, and 1959 Agreements
was the subject of controversy. The upstream States believed that the purpose of the
Cooperative Framework project was to produce an inclusive agreement that would
replace and supersede the previous agreements. The lower riparian States – Egypt
and Sudan – insisted that the new agreement must explicitly recognize the earlier
treaties, referred to as “existing agreements,” and would continue to be binding
against all riparian States.86 In an attempt to address the controversy, the negotiators
of the CFA introduced the new and non-legal concept of water security.87 The
principle of water security would have replaced the provision proposed to govern the
relationship between CFA and the existing agreements because an agreement could
not be reached on such provision.88 The idea was that since Egypt was concerned
about its water security, water security could be protected in a new provision and the
relationship between the CFA and the “existing agreements” could be left to the
general rules of international law.89 However, the Nile Basin States were not able to
agree on the draft provision on water security, contained in Article 14 of the draft
CFA.90 Specifically, the lower riparian States opposed Article 14 of the draft CFA
which in pertinent part, provide that the Nile States “recognize the vital importance
of water security to each of them . . . [and the] Nile Basin States therefore agree, in
a spirit of cooperation not to significantly affect the water security of any other Nile
Basin State.”91 The lower riparians insisted that the language should be amended to
obligate all Basin States “not to adversely affect the water security and current uses
and rights of any other Nile Basin State.”92 The upstream States did not accept that
proposal and opened the agreement for signature on May 14, 2010.93 The CFA has
been signed by six upstream States and ratified by three since that date.94 By its

85. Id.; see also Ana Elisa Cascão, Use of Ambiguity in Transboundary River Basins Negotiations:
The Case of the Nile River Basin, http://www.inweb.gr/twm4/abs/CASCAO%20Ana.pdf (last visited
Nov. 10, 2017).
86. Interview with Professor McCaffrey, supra note 84; see also generally Dereje Zeleke Mekonnen,
The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement Negotiations and the Adoption of a ‘Water Security’
Paradigm: Flight into Obscurity or a Logical Cul-de-sac? 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 421 (2010).
87. Interview with Professor McCaffrey, supra note 84; see also Mekonnen, supra note 86, at 43640.
88. Interview with Professor McCaffrey, supra note 84.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.; see also Mekonnen, supra note 86, at 428
92. Id.
93. By opening the draft CFA for signature, the upstream State have used the document as counterhegemonic strategy. Among others, they used the document to politically isolate the lower riparians and
change the narrative that Egypt is the gift of Nile. See Mahemud Tekuya, The Egyptian Hydro-Hegemony
in the Nile Basin: The Quest for Changing the Status Quo, J. WATER L. 14 (2018).
94. Agreement on the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework, May 2010, http://www
.nilebasin.org/ (follow “About” tab to “CFA” hyperlink; then follow “download” hyperlink) (last visited
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terms, the CFA requires six ratifications to enter into force.95 Therefore, as it exists
today, the CFA neither binds the lower riparian States nor reallocates the waters of
the Nile.
After signing the CFA, Ethiopia started constructing the GERD some 20
km upstream from the border with Sudan on the Blue Nile. Egypt and Sudan initially
opposed the dam alleging that it would significantly affect their interest and violate
the rules regulating the Nile watercourse.96 Considering the enormous advantages it
would get from the dam, Sudan immediately changed its position and started to
support the construction of the dam.97 Gradually, after painstaking negotiations,98
Egypt accepted the importance of the dam and the three States signed an Agreement
of Declarations of Principles (DoPs) on the GERD on March 23, 2015.99 Although
the legal status of the document is debatable,100 the DoPs reiterates the most
fundamental principles of international water law.
Generally, it can be said that the legal regime governing the Nile
watercourse consists of a number of legal instruments, none of which involves all
Basin States or applies to the Basin as a whole. Despite the fragmented nature of the
treaties, the following part of this article analyses the flexibility of the most
prominent legal instruments, the 1959 Agreement, the CFA and DoPs, and assesses
their capacity to adapt to climate change.
2.

The 1959 Agreement

As the table demonstrates, the 1959 Agreement does not incorporate most
of the mechanisms essential for treaty flexibility. The Agreement does not follow a
proportion allocation strategy.. It also fails to address flooding and does not have
provisions regarding amendment process and periodic review. Moreover, it
envisages perpetual applicability and does not allow for termination by the riparian
States.

April 7, 2019) [hereinafter CFA]. Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania have signed
the Agreement, and three states Ethiopia, Tanzania and Rwanda have ratified it.
95. Id. at art. 43.
96. See Presentation, Salman M. A. Salman, Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: Challenges and
Opportunities (2011), https://iwra.org/member/congress/resource/1035_Salman_Lowther_Thurs.pdf
(stating that Egypt and Sudan considered the GERD as violation of the 1902 Treaty).
97. See Tawfik, supra note 12, at 24.
98. See generally Salman, supra note 14 (for the negotiation process).
99. Agreement on Declaration of Principles between the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Republic of the Sudan on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
Project, Egypt-Eth.-Sudan, Mar. 23, 2015, https://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/regiona
ldocs/Final_Nile_Agreement_23_March_2015.pdf [hereinafter DoPs]; Salman, supra note 14, at 520.
100. Concerning the status of DoPs, this author anticipates three possible arguments: (1) it is a soft
law and does not bind the three countries; (2) it is a hard law and should be honored in good faith; and (3)
it is the declaratory principles of customary international watercourses law. For a detailed analysis of each
argument, see Tekuya, supra note 93, at 15-17.
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1959 Treaty

CFA

DoPs

Yes, but Fixed

Equitable
utilization

Equitable utilization

Yes
No

Yes
Yes

No
No

No
No

Yes, but too
rigid
No

No
No

Termination Clause

No

No

RBOs

Yes

Yes, but
inappropriate
Yes

Extreme events
I. Drought
II. Flood
Amendment
and
Review
I. Amendment
II. Review

No

The 1959 Agreement does not allocate any water for the upstream States. It
allocates the waters of the Nile only between Egypt and Sudan. As the 1929
Agreement determined the “established rights” of the two States, the 1959
Agreement allocated only the net benefit generated from the construction of the
HAD.101 Of the 32 BCM gross gain expected after the construction of HAD, the
Agreement deducts 10 BCM for evaporation and seepage, and divides the remaining
22 BCM in 2:1 ratio in favor of Sudan or 14.5 BCM for Sudan and 7.5 BCM for
Egypt.102 Then, by adding the net benefits to the established rights of each State, the
Agreement allocates fixed volumetric quantity of waters between the two States,
55.5 BCM to Egypt and 18.5 BCM to Sudan. This allocation strategy is very rigid
and at odd with the proportional allocation strategy discussed in Part III.
As to extreme events, the drought provision of the 1959 Agreement states
that, if normal yearly quotas cannot be drawn during the low years,103 the Permanent
Joint Technical Committee (PJTC) will devise fair arrangements and submit
proposals to both governments for approval.104 As to the high flow years,105 the

101. See 1959 Agreement, supra note 81, at art. II, ¶ 3-4; Goldenman, supra note 10, at 753-54. The
net benefit is as follows:
Mean natural river supply at Aswan 84 BCM
Less over-year storage losses
-10
Egypt’s Established right
-48
Sudan’s Established right
-4
Total net benefit
22 BCM
102. See 1959 Agreement, supra note 81, at art. II, ¶ 4.
103. ‘Low years’ are years when the water flows are below the average mean natural river supply at
Aswan (84 BCM).
104. See 1959 Agreement, supra note 81, at art. IV, ¶ 1(e).
105. ‘High years’ are years when the water flows are above the average mean natural river supply at
Aswan (84 BCM).
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Agreement requires the two States to divide net benefits equally.106 The Agreement,
like many watercourse treaties, does not provide for any flood controlling
mechanism.107 Yet, flooding is a real problem in the Nile Basin, and its frequency is
projected to be exacerbated by climate change.108
Furthermore, the 1959 Agreement provides no guidance regarding the
amendment and review of its provisions. It does, however, envisage the revision of
the net benefit generated from the HAD.109 Both parties are allowed to revise the net
benefit “at reasonable intervals to be agreed upon as from the date of the operation
of the complete” HAD.110 Although the intended revision is important for building
flexibility, it has not been pragmatically applied throughout the Basin’s history.
Moreover, as the subject of revision is only “the net benefit”, but not “the established
rights” of the two States, the Agreement’s ability to tackle severely diminished river
flows due to climate change is questionable. Also, the Agreement does not have a
termination clause and hence does not permit the riparian States to end their treaty
obligations.
Indeed, the establishment of the PJTC is the most important achievement of
the 1959 Agreement.111 But, the authority given to the Committee is restricted to
administrative matters like overseeing construction and storage works, including the
HAD.112 The PJTC has no authority to adopt, amend, or extend the existing
arrangements between riparian States. Moreover, this Agreement neither provides a
dispute settlement procedure nor does it give the PJTC authority to resolve regional
disputes concerning the Nile watercourse. Additionally, it does not oblige Egypt and
Sudan to share hydrological data.113 In a nutshell, it can be said that rigidity is the
salient feature of the 1959 Agreement and that it lacks the intrinsic capacity for
dealing with the ramifications of climate change.
3.

The Cooperative Framework Agreement

The CFA does not use the fixed and volumetric allocations strategy, does
not provide a minimum flow to the downstream States, and does not allocate the Nile
waters proportionally. Instead, it uses equitable and reasonable utilization as an
allocation strategy. By allowing all riparian States to use the Nile waters equitably,114

106. See 1959 Agreement, supra note 81, at art. II ¶ 4 (“But if the average yield increases, the resulting
net benefit from this increase shall be divided between the two Republics, in equal shares.”).
107. Goldenman, supra note 10, at 754-55.
108. See U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, supra note 33, at 13-14. Compare Conway, supra note 35, at 106
(analyzing climate models which predict drier scenarios), with Dam Bluster: How Climate Change Might Affect
the Nile, ECONOMIST (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa
/21725802-egypt-ethiopia-and-sudan-will-have-learn-share-water-or-their-people-will (analyzing a
climate model which predicts wetter scenarios).
109. See 1959 Agreement, supra note 81, at art. II, ¶ 5.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at art. IV, ¶ 1.
113. See Goldenman, supra note 10, at 755 (indicating how “Egypt regards its data on Nile flows and
its consumption of those waters to be highly confidential matters of national security”); see generally
1959 Agreement, supra note 81.
114. CFA, supra note 94, at art. 4, ¶ 1.
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the CFA illustrates the relevant factors for determining equitable and reasonable
utilization of the water resource.115
The climate, hydrology, and other physical characteristics of the Nile River
System are among the factors contained in the list of factors for determining
equitable and reasonable utilization.116 The CFA lists “[c]onservation, protection,
development and economy of use of the water resources”117 as factors, thus
potentially providing the basis for more efficient uses as part of adaptation to
decreased flows. Moreover, in recognizing that these factors, including climate,
might change over time, it requires riparian States to “keep the status of their water
utilization under review in light of substantial changes in relevant factors and
circumstances.”118
The CFA does not, however, provide guidance as to how to weigh the
various factors, including climate. It simply asserts that the weight to be given to
each factor must be determined by comparing it to the other factors, all of which
must be considered as a whole.119 It also empowers the Council of Ministers (COM),
one of the organs of the Nile Basin Commission (NBC), to determine equitable
utilization of waters in each riparian State.120 As discussed below, while empowering
the Commission is essential for treaty flexibility, the composition of the COM and
the absence of specific review periods under the CFA would hinder the role of the
NBC.
The CFA provides for an amendment process by setting forth procedures
that States are to follow. Article 35 of the CFA sets forth two distinct rules for
approving proposed amendments, one requiring consensus and another requiring a
two-thirds majority vote.121 Specifically, proposals to alter Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9,
14, 23, 24, 33, and 34 can only be approved by consensus.”122 All other provisions
and any protocol can be amended by a two-thirds majority vote if States cannot reach
an agreement by consensus.123 However, adopting a new proposal requires
consensus.124
The first amendment procedure of the CFA is quite rigid because it requires
consensus.125 The consensus requirement appears too idealistic and does not consider
the hydro-political landscape of the Basin. There are intricacies that would make it
hard for the Basin States to arrive at a consensus. Some of these intricacies include
115. Id. at ¶ 2.
116. Id. at ¶ 2(a).
117. Id. at ¶ 2(f).
118. Id. at ¶ 5.
119. Id. at ¶ 4.
120. Id. at art 24, ¶ 12.
121. Id. at art. 36, ¶ 3.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at art 34, ¶ 4.
125. Id. at art. 36. For insistence, due to the threats of climate change, the Nile Basin States may find
it appropriate to change the allocation strategy followed in the CFA from equitable utilization (Article 4)
into proportional allocation. But, because of the requirement of consensus, they may not be able to amend
Article 4 of the CFA. Although consensus does not necessarily mean unanimity, it does require at least
the non-objection of some Basin countries (Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia), giving them the opportunity to
hinder the amendment proses.
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issues such as alarming population growth, suspicion and misunderstanding between
the Basin States, high dependency on the river, coercive hegemonic policy, and
emphasis on military solutions. Moreover, reaching consensus, if at all possible,
requires painstakingly lengthy diplomatic negotiations. Yet, addressing rapid climate
change may often require prompt responses, which in return requires building more
flexibility into the amendment procedures.
Other procedural issues, such as developing new protocols and periodically
reviewing existing agreements, are also important mechanisms to deal with future
climatic uncertainties. Although Article 34 of CFA allows the Nile Basin States to
adopt new protocols by consensus, no instrument shall be inconsistent with the
provisions of the CFA.126 Moreover, the CFA does not provide for periodic review.
It does, however, empower one of its organs, the COM, to “review and revise . . .
rules, procedures, guidelines and criteria for the implementation of the provisions
of . . . “ the CFA.127 While flexibility is implicit in this provision, the fact that the
COM is not empowered to review the CFA itself and the absence of specified period
within which the CFA would be reviewed could render this call for flexibility of
limited value.
Concerning extreme events, the CFA has an explicit provision that includes
all “steps of the [climate change] adaptation chain – prevention, preparedness,
response, and recovery.”128 In this respect, Article 12 of the CFA governing
emergency situations states:
1. For the purposes of this provision, “emergency” means a
situation that causes, or poses an imminent threat of causing,
serious harm to Nile Basin States or other States and that results
suddenly from natural causes, such as floods, landslides or
earthquakes, or from human conduct, such as industrial accidents.
2. A Nile Basin State shall, without delay and by the most
expeditious means available, notify other potentially affected
States and competent international organizations of any
emergency
originating
in
its
territory.
3. A Nile Basin State within whose territory an emergency
originates shall, in cooperation with potentially affected States
and, where appropriate, competent international organizations,
immediately take all practicable measures necessitated by the
circumstances to prevent, mitigate and eliminate harmful effects
of the emergency.

126. Id. at art. 34 (To address the ramification of climate change, the Nile Basin States may need to
renegotiate the CFA and change some of its principles by adopting a new protocol that reflect current
circumstances. Article 34 forecloses this possibility by requiring such protocol to conform with the
principles of the CFA).
127. Id. at art. 24, ¶ 11.
128. EARLE ET AL., supra note 29, at 143.
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4. When necessary, Nile Basin States shall jointly develop
contingency plans for responding to emergencies, in cooperation,
where appropriate, with other potentially affected States and
competent international organizations.129
As demonstrated in this article, the CFA addresses the possible
ramifications of climate change by incorporating the most recent “sophisticated
global climate change discourse.”130 The CFA is unique in underscoring that “the
response to climate extreme events must be collective, and not only at [a] national
level.”131
However, Article 12 of the CFA does not include flooding as an emergency
situation. The CFA addresses flooding in Article 11 concerning the prevention and
mitigation of harmful conditions.132 Article 11, in relevant part, requires Nile Basin
States “to take all appropriate measures to prevent or mitigate conditions related to
the Nile River System that may be harmful to other Nile Basin States . . . resulting
from . . . causes, such as . . . drought or desertification.”133 While this provision
requires the prevention and mitigation of possible harms resulting from drought, it
does not provide guidance as to how the riparian States shall use the Nile water
during the time of drought. Nor does it address how the waters of the Nile would be
allocated during the low years.
Examining such gaps and considering the failure of the CFA to use
proportional allocation strategy, one may wonder, during the time of drought, what
kind of uses, such as domestic and sanitation, irrigation, or generation of
hydroelectric power, will be given priority. Another question is how riparian States
will share the water deficiencies occurring during the time of drought. There is no
doubt that the lack of concrete guidance regarding priorities among such uses along
with the absence of a proportional allocation strategy will pose a significant
challenge for the NBC to determine the equitability of the uses in each riparian State.
Concerning termination, the CFA allows the Basin States to withdraw from
the Treaty any time after two years from the date of its entry into force.134 The only
requirement is that the State terminating its treaty obligation shall give written
notifications to the depositary.135 “The withdrawal shall take place upon expiry of
one year after the date of its receipt by the Depositary . . . “136
The time limit in which States can withdraw from the Treaty is very short.
This abbreviated timeline would cause a fundamental funding problem with the
overall CFA. One of the considerations behind the negotiations of the CFA was
identifying how the agreement would provide security for international financial
institutions and donor countries. Indeed, ensuring financial security would require a
129. CFA, supra note 94, at art. 12.
130. EARLE ET AL., supra note 29, at 143.
131. See id. at 121 (Among others, this discourse considers climate change as cross border issue, and
suggest adaptation measures will be more effective when undertaken in coordination (joint measures) with
the neighboring countries).
132. CFA, supra note 94, at art. 11.
133. Id.
134. Id. at art. 40, ¶ 1.
135. Id.
136. Id. at art. 40, ¶ 2.
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great deal of certainty and predictability within the terms of the agreement. Yet,
ultimately the termination clause hindered the needed certainty by enabling any
riparian State to terminate its treaty obligations within a year effectively.
Ironically, it is even difficult to justify the termination clause on the ground
of treaty flexibility. As indicated above, owing to the certainty and predictability
required for the operation of dams and reservoirs, building flexibility through
termination clause is found to be inappropriate for watercourse treaties “involv[ing]
permanent structures . . . “137 The CFA involves permanent structures, dams, and
reservoirs, and is therefore unsuitable for such a termination clause.
The CFA would establish, if and when it enters into force, the NBC as a
joint body for the management and sustainable development of the Nile River Basin.
The NBC is comprised of five organs: (1) Conference of Heads of State and
Government; (2) Council of Ministers; (3) Technical Advisory Committee; (4)
Sectoral Advisory Committees and (5) Secretariat.138
While the Conference of the Heads of State and Government is the supreme
policy-making organ of the NBC,139 the Council of Ministers (COM) is the
governing body of the NBC.140 The COM is empowered to make binding decisions
by consensus.141 It also has a wide range of powers, which, among others, includes
overseeing the implementation of the CFA;142 the power to review and reverse rules,
procedures, guidelines, and criteria for the implementation of the provisions of the
CFA;143 the power to examine and decide the determination of equitable utilization
in each riparian State in accordance with the factors provided under the CFA144 and
the power to resolve disputes between Nile Basin States on the interpretation and
application of the CFA.145
The COM makes its decisions based on the recommendations of the
Technical Advisory Committee (TAC).146 Relevant to climate change, for instance,
the TAC is empowered to “advise the [COM] on technical matters relating to the use,
development, protection, conservation and management of the Nile River Basin and
the Nile River System, including protection from drought and floods.”147Noticeably,
the functional scope of the NBC encompasses multiple issues ranging from
promoting the rights and obligations of the Basin States to the development,
protection, conservation, and management of the Nile River Basin and its waters.
Certainly, such a wide range of authorities will enable the NBC to ensure integrated
river basin management addressing various aspects like environmental protection
and water allocation under one institutional umbrella. This will, in turn, give the

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

McCaffrey, supra note 5, at 160.
CFA, supra note 94, at art. 17.
Id. at art. 21.
Id. at art. 24, ¶ 1.
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NBC the potential to deal with changes in the River Basin and address the
ramifications of climate change.
Moreover, as indicated above, there is much uncertainty as to future water
availability in the Nile Basin and studies are projecting both flooding and water
scarcity.148 The CFA seems to address this very issue by empowering the TAC to
propose, and submit to the COM, various strategies for adapting to the two possible
ramifications of climate change: floods and drought.149 Also, while determining
equitable utilization, it may reduce or increase allocations in response to changing
levels of precipitation or flow and consider other changing conditions.
The NBC is also empowered to control data and information management.
It has the power to develop procedures through which the Nile Basin States shall
regularly and readily exchange available and relevant data and information on
existing measures and the condition of water resources of the Basin.150 The Basin
States also agree to exchange information concerning planned measures through the
NBC.151 Concerning data management, one of its organs, the Secretariat, is tasked
“to compile available data and information and coordinate . . . monitoring of
information relating to the Nile Basin, including the environment, review . . . and
synthesize . . . the information with a view to integrating it into basin-wide databases
and establishing standards, and develop . . . mechanisms for the regular exchange of
information where needed.”152
The existence of this formal information exchange system in the CFA will
bring about more resilience and adjustment to climate change by enhancing reliable
recordkeeping, honest disclosures and notifications, and good faith efforts to
accommodate the concerns of fellow riparian States.153 Certainly, the sharing of data
between the Basin States will “give decision makers the flexibility to continuously
review strategies, policies as well as activities and change management if
necessary.”154 This, in turn, will boost the capacity of the NBC to conduct adaptive
water management when environmental and social changes require change.
Additionally, the Commission may serve as a mediator or conciliator to
settle disputes between Nile Basin States on the interpretation and application of the
CFA.155 It is likely that the ramifications of climate change, such as floods and
droughts, will exacerbate potential disputes over water resources. Hence, the
existence of clear conflict resolution mechanisms in the CFA is a highly
commendable one and important for adaptive transboundary water governance. 156
As indicated above, the COM also has rulemaking authority. All decisions
of the COM are binding on the Basin States if they are made by consensus.157 Since
adaptation requires prompt decisions to respond to changing conditions, the COM
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decision-making procedure, particularly the requirement of consensus, will pose
significant challenges to successful adaptation. Although consensus does not
necessarily mean unanimity, it does require at least the non-objection of those Nile
Basin States whose interests are classified as high and very high.158 This in effect
will give any of them the opportunity “to obstruct the majority of actors from passing
a decision,”159 and thus compromise the COM’s ability “to react in a timely manner
in cases of urgency such as of abrupt environmental change.”160
The composition of the COM, which is comprised of the Minister for Water
Affairs of each Nile Basin State,161 will also be a big challenge for the flexibility
needed to respond to climate change. This is because the Ministers are political
appointees who will advance the interests of their respective State and critical
decisions need to go through time-consuming diplomatic negotiations. Yet, such
“ordinary diplomatic mechanisms will be inefficient to deal with the volume of
decisions that climate change will bring.”162 Reaching agreements through
diplomacy has proven to be challenging in the Nile Basin and controversial decisions
have rarely been taken in the Basin’s history. This trend will significantly slow down
the process of adaptation to climate change. Unless the Basin States are willing to
invest the NBC with authority to make at least provisional decisions, it is unlikely to
build the flexibility needed to accommodate climate change successfully.163
Membership is the other significant problem ahead for the NBC. As
indicated above, Egypt and Sudan have not ratified the CFA. When the CFA enters
in to force, the NBC will succeed to all rights, obligations, and assets of the Nile
Basin Initiative (NBI) upon the entry into force of the CFA.164 If the CFA enters into
force, “[w]hat will happen to the rights and obligations under the NBI of the States
that are not parties (and do not plan to be parties) to the CFA?”165 There is no doubt
that this impedes effective adaptation since the lower riparian States are not
integrated into the CFA, leaving their actions as to the utilization of the Nile waters
and climate change adaptation outside the NBC. Moreover, the insufficiently
developed cooperation between Egypt and upstream States, the absence of
158. See Salman, supra note 14, at 18 (“The stakes of Egypt, Sudan, South Sudan and Ethiopia in the
Nile are classified as very high; those of Uganda as high; those Tanzania, Kenya, Burundi, and Rwanda
as moderate; and those of Eritrea and Democratic Republic of Congo as low.”)
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160. Id.
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162. See Goldenman, supra note 10, at 801.
163. This proposal could be considered as an erosion of the Basin States’ sovereignty. But, in its first
judgment, the PCIJ said in The Wimbledon that entering into a treaty is not giving up sovereignty, it is an
expression of sovereignty. This should be treated the same way, with regard to conferring the necessary
powers on the Commission. Moreover, as responding to the ramifications of climate change requires
urgent decision-making process, activating the Commission’s “dormant” authority for the limited purpose
of dealing with climate emergencies is imperative.
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commitment concerning the exchange of hydrological data, as well as the
disagreement as to the filling and operation of the GERD are likely to become
significant impediments to successful integration in the river basin.
4.

The Declaration of Principles (DoPs)

The DoPs is a unique addition to the legal regime governing the use of the
Nile watercourse. The DoPs is signed by Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan to govern the
GERD and minimize its potential adverse effect on the lower riparian States. Like
the CFA, the DoPs use equitable utilization as an allocation strategy. The DoPs does
not allocate fixed volumetric water for any of the riparian States. Instead, it simply
allows the three States to use “their shared water resources in their respective
territories in an equitable and reasonable manner.”166
The DoPs lists the factors provided in the CFA as the relevant factors to be
considered in determining equitable and reasonable utilization.167 However, unlike
the CFA, the DoPs does not establish any organ responsible for assessing these
factors and determining what amounts to equitable use in individual cases. Nor does
it provide any guidance for the equitable allocation of “the shared water” during the
filling and operation of the GERD. Instead, the DoPs merely recommends that the
three States agree on rules concerning the first filling and operation of the GERD
based on the recommendation of an International Panel of Experts.168 So far, the three
States have not agreed on the filling and operation of the GERD, and hence there is
currently no mechanism governing how Ethiopia shall fill the GERD reservoir, and
especially no mechanisms governing filling and operation during times of flood and
drought. This is especially problematic because the first filling of the dam might
occur during a flood or drought time as the Nile watercourse is experiencing
“increase in the flow variation from year to year,”169 flood in one year and drought
in another. In addition, no guarantee exists on Ethiopia’s part to provide the
minimum water requirement for Egypt and Sudan.
The DoPs also does not include a mechanism for dealing with extreme
climate events. It says that Ethiopia will inform the downstream States of any
unforeseen or urgent circumstances requiring adjustments in the operation of
GERD.170 While data and information exchange is important for adapting to climate
change, the DoPs impose no obligation Ethiopia’s part to inform the downstream
States concerning the operation of the GERD. Moreover, in order to address the
projected ramifications of climate change, particularly flooding and drought, it is
critical that “the GERD, HAD, and Sudan’s reservoirs [are] operated in coordination
by Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan.”171 The DoPs does not address this matter, and
166. DoPs, supra note 99, at princ. IV para. 1.
167. Id. at para. 2, subsec. a-i.
168. Id. at princ. V, para. 2, subsec. a-b.
169. Kavya Balaraman, A New Dam on the Nile Reveals Threats from Warming, SCI. AM.: E&E NEWS
(May 5, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/a-new-dam-on-the-nile-reveals-threats-fromwarming/.
170. DoPs, supra note 99, at princ. V, para. II, subsec. c.
171. INT’L, NON-PARTISAN EASTERN NILE WORKING GRP., MIT ABDUL LATIF JAMEEL WORLD
WATER AND FOOD SEC. LAB, THE GRAND ETHIOPIAN RENAISSANCE DAM: AN OPPORTUNITY FOR
COLLABORATION AND SHARED BENEFITS IN THE EASTERN NILE BASIN 3-4 (2014).
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currently, there is no agreement for the coordinated operation of those dams. This
type of agreement is important to make sure that the operation of the GERD will not
significantly harm the lower riparian States “during the filling period or [the] periods
of prolonged drought.”172
To deal with the hardships of the projected extreme drought years, the Nile
Basin States “will need to build more reservoirs and storage capacity.”173 Given the
tension the GERD has caused, one can easily imagine the problem that building
additional storage may cause.174 Issues such as where to build additional storage and
under whose control need to be addressed to enhance the adaptive potential of the
Basin. Moreover, like the CFA, the DoPs does not provide a review period. However,
flexibility in the filling and operation of the dam and adapting to climate variability
requires continuous and periodic review of the strategies in light of new knowledge
and changing circumstances.
Generally, it can be said that the Nile Basin still requires an agreement, one
which is flexible enough to adapt to climate variability, defines the minimum water
requirement for the lower riparian States, and regulates the operations of the two
reservoirs, the HAD and GERD, accordingly.
V.

THE WAY FORWARD: TOWARDS A BASIN-WIDE CLIMATEPROOF TREATY

As demonstrated above, the Nile Basin is highly vulnerable to the impacts
of climate change. The ramifications of climate change, particularly the rising of
average temperatures and uncertainty as to the availability of water, pose substantial
challenges to the use and management of the Nile watercourse. Building flexibility
and adaptability into a Nile treaty or developing a basin-wide climate-proof treaty is
imperative to overcome these challenges. However, as indicated above, the Nile
Basin does not have an all-inclusive climate proof treaty. Even the CFA lacks the
flexibility needed to adapt to climate change. For the CFA to be a climate-proof
treaty, its amendment is a matter of necessity. In this part, the article proposes a
revised form of the CFA as a climate-proof treaty, suggesting mechanisms for
building more flexibility into the agreement to accommodate climate change.
The allocation strategy followed by the CFA and the governing rule of the
Nile watercourse is equitable and reasonable utilization. There is no doubt that
flexibility is implicit in this principle. However, with the anticipated impacts of
climate change, what is equitable today could very well be inequitable tomorrow.
The CFA attempts to address this problem by empowering the COM to determine
the equitable utilization of each riparian State by considering the factors provided
therein. Given the COM’s composition, determining equitable utilization is likely to
be highly politicized. In the COM’s attempt to arrive at consensus “national interests
[would] trump equitable considerations or become disguised in a party’s weighting
of factors.”175 An explicit provision governing how to weight various factors, and
determining priorities among uses, therefore, is extremely necessary as it will
172.
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“greatly ease the process of determining an equitable utilization of a river’s waters
in the event of climate-related alterations in flow.”176
More specifically, since the drought provision of the CFA does not address
the allocation or reallocation of the water, ensuring equitable utilization during the
low years would be extremely difficult. One possible way out of this problem is to
provide a minimum water quantity for lower riparian States and allow the upstream
States to deliver below such quantity during drought seasons. However, given
Egypt’s dependency on the Nile, this approach is unrealistic. Hence, including a
percentage allocation strategy in the CFA and sharing the possible water
deficiencies, and surplus, proportionally among the Basin States is imperative to
build the flexibility needed to accommodate climate change successfully.
The CFA requires the riparian States to prevent and mitigate the problem of
flooding. But, neither the DoPs nor the CFA provides guidance regarding the
operation of dams at the time of flooding. Moreover, given the recent increase in the
flow variation, specific provisions governing how Ethiopia will fill the GERD during
times of flood and drought are necessary. Also, to address the problems of flooding
and drought, it is imperative that an explicit provision calling for joint operations of
the GERD, HAD, and Sudan’s reservoirs is included.
Furthermore, as indicated above, to deal with the hardships of the projected
extreme drought years, Nile Basin States will need to build more reservoirs and
storage capacity. Accordingly, specific provisions specifying the places to build
additional joint storage are necessary. The recommendation is to build additional
storage in the upstream States and also shift the existing ones to the upstream States
in order to get net water savings due to the lower evaporation losses in these States.
Moreover, flexibility in the filling and operation of the dams, and adapting to climate
variability would also require continuous and periodic review of the strategies in
light of new knowledge and changing circumstances.
The ramifications of climate change can be expected to necessitate the
reallocation of the Nile waters. Periodic review is important to ensure equitability in
the face of extreme climate uncertainty. The CFA does not provide for periodic
review, and thus ensuring equitable allocation of the Nile during the extreme climate
events is hardly possible. The revised form of the CFA needs to include explicit
provisions concerning the adjustment and review of the Agreement in general, and
in particular, regarding the equitable allocation of the Nile waters to adapt to the
ramifications of climate change. Moreover, it should define what constitutes climate
change and specify when adjustments would be necessary. The latter can be done by
setting down “triggers” (magnitude of climate change) that would activate treaty
adjustments or by merely providing specific periods when the agreement should be
reviewed.177
Apart from reviewing, parties also may withdraw from treaty obligations so
as to free themselves from an inequitable allocation of the watercourse. The CFA
allows any riparian State to withdraw from the treaty upon a one-year period of
notice. While this is important for treaty flexibility, it is in strict contrast with the
predictability and certainty required for the effective management of the Nile
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watercourse, especially where infrastructure is involved. This provision defeats the
purpose of the CFA as it compromises the security needed by the riparian States and
the donor communities. The flexibility required for adapting to climate change and
the certainty required for smooth operations of dams would be reconciled if a long
period of notice, say 10-15 years, is required to withdraw from the treaty, while at
the same time empowering the NBC to review the equitable allocation of the waters
periodically. For instance, the Columbia River Treaty between Canada and the
United States, which is focused on hydroelectric power production and flood
protection, provides for either party to give 10 years notice of termination, but only
beginning some sixty years after the Treaty’s entry into force.178
As per the CFA, the NBC has rulemaking authority. The requirement of
consensus along with the composition of the COM will, however, cause a big
challenge for the flexibility needed to respond to climate change. One way out of this
problem would be reorganizing the structure and the composition of the NBC.
Instead of the Conference Heads of States, the revised form of the CFA should
empower the COM as the supreme policy making-organ of the NBC. Moreover, it
should establish a new Technical Committee with independent authority. The
Technical Committee should be composed of experts, not political appointees, and
the Committee should be given all powers of the COM under the current CFA. To
efficiently respond to the ramifications of climate change, the Committee should be
empowered to make provisional binding decisions as to the use and management of
the Nile waters, including review and amendments, and its decisions should be
effective immediately until and unless disapproved within six months by the COM.
Furthermore, as compliance is extremely important for the effectiveness of this kind
of institutional arrangement, the Basin States political commitment to successfully
follow through and implement decisions both at national and Basin level is a matter
of necessity. Also, the establishment of a compliance or implementation committee
that will review the Nile Basin States’ compliance with their obligations under the
revised CFA and the institutional arrangement proposed in this article is critical.
Membership is the other problem related to the NBC. Given the fact that
the revised CFA would protect the interests of the lower riparian States, it is expected
that they will join it and be members of the organ envisaged in this article. In the
event any Basin State refuses to join such a revised CFA, its interest must be
protected in that it should retain its membership in the NBI. Accordingly, the
provision which requires the transfer of the rights and obligations of the NBI to the
NBC upon the entry into force of the CFA needs to be amended or should be
considered as effective between States that are parties to an in-force CFA.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Governing the Nile Basin under climate uncertainty requires responding to
two possible contradictory scenarios: increase in water availability or flooding and
also water scarcity or drought, each of which requires adaptation strategies that are
the opposite of those required of the other. Although flexible and resilient legal and
institutional arrangements are at the heart of such adaptation strategies, the legal
regime governing the Nile Basin lacks the flexibility needed to adapt to climate
178. Columbia River Treaty-CRT, supra note 56, at art. XIX, § 2.
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change. Of the three most known legal instruments, the CFA is a big step forward
for governing the Nile Basin under climatic uncertainty. However, the CFA itself
lacks the intrinsic capacity for addressing the ramifications of climate change.
Among others, the CFA falls short of providing a review period and
guidance as to how the Nile waters should be allocated in low times or drought
seasons. These omissions, along with the need for joint operation of dams in the
Basin, renders revision of the CFA imperative in order to build the flexibility needed
for successful adaptation to climate change. Moreover, the CFA has some features
of rigidity in its amendment and decision-making process. Given the hydro-political
landscape of the Nile Basin, the rather unrealistic requirement of “consensus”, both
for altering the agreement and issuing binding decisions, will significantly
undermine the CFA’s ability to adapt to climate change. It will also foreclose a
possible role of the NBC in building more flexibility into the Agreement.
Accordingly, the need for addressing the ramifications of climate change requires
the Nile Basin States to reorganize the structure and composition of the NBC in such
a manner as will ensure an expedited decision-making process that is capable of
responding to rapid development brought on by climate change. In addition, the Nile
Basin States should empower a Commission, comprising of experts, with
independent authority to make at least provisionally binding decisions.
For many years, the Nile Basin States have been using the existing
fragmented legal regime to protect their narrow self-interests. But now, with the
ever-increasing threats of climate change, the time seems ripe to set aside such
egoistic national interests and address the ramifications of climate change by
developing a basin-wide, climate-proof treaty.

